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Recovery of Damages for Injuries Sustained
by Children en Ventre sa Mere
DANIEL

A. RULEY, JR.*

The principal legal question dealt with here is whether there
is a cause of action for the wrongful death of a child which while
en ventre sa mere is injured and subsequently is bom dead as the
result of negligence of a third party. This question is closely related
to the questions of: (1) whether there is a cause of action for
the wrongful death of a child which while en ventre sa mere is
injured as the result of negligence of a third party, subsequently
is born alive and then dies as a result of such injuries; and (2)
whether a child may maintain a cause of action for damages for
personal injuries sustained as the result of negligence of a third
party while it was en ventre sa mere. There is no precedent in
West Virginia which is directly in point respecting any of the three
questions. As will be demonstrated hereinafter, the marked trend
of authority is toward permitting recovery of damages in all of
the three situations.
I.

WEST VIRGINIA STATUTES

The current West Virginia statutes relating to actions for wrongful death refer to death of a "person."' This is a common, if not
universal, term in wrongful death statutes. It gives rise to the basic
inquiry of whether a child en ventre sa mere is a "person."
II.

MALONE V. MONONGAHELA VALLEY TRACTION Co.

Malone v. Monongahela Valley Traction Co.' is the only West
Virginia case even remotely related to the instant question. It was
an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff
*Member, West Virginia State Bar. Attorney at Law, Parkersburg, West
Virginia.
'W. VA. CODE, ch. 55, art. 7, §§ 5,6 (Michie 1961).
104 W. Va. 417, 140 S.E. 340 (1927).
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which had resulted in a miscarriage. A verdict for the plaintiff
was set aside by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
because of a prejudicially erroneous instruction permitting the jury
to award damages for "the pain, suffering and mental anguish, if
any, the plaintiff sustained by reason of the injuries to and for
the death of said child, and for the resultant pain and mental anguish,
if any, suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the loss of said child."
A fair inference from this decision is that, if West Virginia recognizes
any civil legal remedy for a wrong inflicted upon the person of a
child en ventre sa mere, it will have to be a remedy falling into one
of the three classifications of civil actions to which this paper
relates.'
Il.

MEDICAL TERMINOLOGY

An understanding of the following medical terms will facilitate
understanding of the cases on this subject:4
(a) viable fetus-a fetus capable of living outside the
womb or uterus;
(b) abortion--expulsion of fetus from uterus before viable, i.e., before the 24th week (28th week according to Taber),
the fetus measuring 35 cm. or less and weighing less than
3
lbs.;
(c) miscarriage-expulsion of fetus from uterus after
four months and before viable;
(d) premature delivery-expulsion of fetus from uterus
after viable but before full term.
IV.

CASE LAW

A detailed statement of all of the cases concerning the three
principal questions is not warranted because of their volume. Accordingly, although all of the cases which an exhaustive search has
disclosed will be cited herein, only the more significant cases will
be discussed in detail.
A. Early Cases
The first case on the subject in either the United States or the
United Kingdom and formerly the leading case was the case of
Dietrich v. Northampton5 where in an opinion written by Holmes, J.,

'4 For
cases similar to the Malone case, see Annot
TAmE,

10 A.L.R.2d 640 (1950).

CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTONARY (7th ed.
MEDICAL DicrnoNAnY FoR LAvYERs (2d ed. 1951).
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PRENATAL INJURIES

the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts laid down the rule
that there could be no recovery for the wrongful death of a child
who was born alive and survived only for a few minutes as a
result of injury to its mother resulting in miscarriage because: such
child was not a "person" within the meaning of the Massachusetts
wrongful death statute; there was no precedent for allowing such
recovery; and, at the time of injury, such child was a part of its
mother. It is interesting to note that, at the time of the injury, the
child's mother was between four and five months advanced in
pregnancy.
Five early decisions followed the Dietrich case in denying
recovery of damages for wrongful death under similar circumstances.'
The first reported judicial voice dissenting from the rule of
the Dietrich case was that of Judge Boggs of the Supreme Court
of Illinois in the case of Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.7 This was
an action by a child for damages for permanent personal injuries
which it had sustained while en ventre sa mere but after it had
become viable. The majority of the court, citing and relying upon
the Dietrich case, held that there could be no recovery. Judge
Boggs' eloquent and didactic dissenting opinion is a landmark. It
warrants full quotation but that is prohibited by its length.
First, he demolished the old argument that there could be no
recovery because there was no precedent for recovery. After quoting
Lord Mansfield's famous declaration, "The law of England would
be an absurd science were it founded upon precedents only,"' he
then quoted Mr. Cooley's work on Torts, as follows:
"But new and peculiar cases must also arise from time
to time, for which the court must find the governing principle,
and these may either be referred to some principle previously
declared, or to some one which now, for the first time, there
is occasion to apply. But a principle newly applied is not
supposed to be a new principle. On the contrary, it is assumed
that from time immemorial it has constituted a part of the
common law of the land, and that it has only not been applied
before because no occasion has arisen for its application."
£

138 Mass. 14 (1844).

Stanford v. St. Louis, S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611 108 So. 566 (1926);
Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United
Ry., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49
AUt. 704 (1901); Magnolia Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d
944 (1935).
7 184 M1l.
359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
8 1 KENT, CowarmNT.As 477.
6
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Judge Boggs then stated that the principle to be applied is the
general principle that the common law, by way of damages, gives
redress for personal injuries inflicted by the wrong or neglect of
another.
Next, Judge Boggs assailed the contention that an unborn
child is merely a part of the mother. Respecting a child en ventre
sa mere, he said:
"* * * if, while in the womb, it reaches that prenatal age of

viability when the destruction of the life of the mother does
not necessarily end its existence also, and when, if separated
prematurely, and by artificial means, from the mother, it
would be so far a matured human being that it would live
and grow, mentally and physically, as other children generally,
it is but to deny a palpable fact to argue that there is but one
life, and that the life of the mother."
He then pointed out that a child en ventre sa mere was regarded at common law as in esse from the time of conception for
purposes of inheritance and also that at common law there was
criminal liability for the death of a child either stillborn or born
alive and afterwards dying as a result of injuries inflicted upon it
while in its mother's womb.
Finally, Judge Boggs stated that natural justice demanded that
the recovery of damages be allowed in such cases. His opinion was
limited, however, to injuries sustained by a child en ventre sa mere
after it became viable.
B.

Personal Injury Cases

Six subsequent cases wherein a child sought damages for personal injuries sustained while it was en ventre sa mere have followed
the majority opinion in the Allaire case9 and denied recovery.'
It is of particular significance that four of them have been overruled.
9 184111. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
10 Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d
307 (1952); Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455 26 A.2d 489, 684 (1942);
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 222, 133 N.E. 567 11921); Mays v. Weingarten,
82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App., 1943); Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547,
16 A.2d 28 (1940); Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec, Ry., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W.
916 (1916).
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It is noteworthy that the four cases which were overruled were in
New York, New Jersey, Ohio and Massachusetts."
Ten subsequent cases have followed or extended the dissenting
opinion of Judge Boggs in the Allaire case"2 and allowed recovery
of damages for personal injuries.'"
In the case of Tucker v. Carmichael'4 the court, after making
detailed observations of the legal processes available for the protection of the property of an unborn child, stated:
"It would therefore be illogical, unrealistic, and unjustboth to the child and to society-for the law to withhold its
processes necessary for the protection of the person of an
unborn child, while, at the same time, making such processes
available for the purpose of protecting its property."
Smith v. Brennan'" is an especially important New Jersey
case because not only did it overrule Stemmer v. Kline 6 but, also,
it discarded the viability test which, of course, first was enunciated
by Judge Boggs. The lucid reasoning of the court in reaching its
decision on the latter point is set out in the opinion as follows:
"The semantic argument whether an unborn child is a
'person in being' seems to us to be beside the point. There is
no question that conception sets in motion biological processes
which if undisturbed will produce what every one will concede
to be a person in being. If in the meanwhile those processes
can be disrupted resulting in harm to the child when born,
" Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912
(1960) (overruling Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., supra note 10);
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (overuling Stemmer v.
Kline, supra note 10); Woos v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691
(1951) (overruling Drobner v. Peters, supra note 10); Williams v. Rapid
Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 234 (1949) (overruling Mays v.
Weingarten, supra note 10).
, 184 Ill.
359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
13 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Tursi v. Windsor
Co., 19 Conn. Super. Ct. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (1955); Tucker v. Carmichael,
208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417,
79 A.2d 550 (1951); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958);
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Woods v. Lancet, 303
N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Williams v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 152
Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690,
291 P.2d 225 (1955); Seattle-First Natl Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835
(Wash. 1962
).
( 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d at 911.
1531 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
16 128 N.J.L. 455,26 A.2d 489, 684 (1942).
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it is immaterial whether before birth the child is considered
a person in being And regardless of analogies to other areas of
the law, justice requires that the principle be recognized that a
child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and
body. If the wrongful conduct of another interferes with that
right, and it can be established by competent proof that there
is a causal connection between the wrongful interference and
the harm suffered by the child when born, damages for such
harm should be recoverable by the child.
"Although the viability distinction has no real justification,
it is explainable historically. The Dietrich case announced a
theory that an unborn child was part of its mother. The first
dissent from this proposition, by Justice Boggs in the Allaire
case pointed out than an unborn child who could sustain life
apart from its mother could not be considered part of her.
The logical appeal of Justice Boggs' approach, coupled with
the understandable conservatism of the earlier courts who
broke with the Dietrich theory, resulted in a rule of recovery
limited by the viability distinction. But the usefulness of that
distinction has disappeared with the modern repudiation of
the Dietrich theory. And since it has no cogent medical reason
to support it, and no relevancy to the harm resulting from
prenatal injury, we do not believe that it has any place in the
determination of the question of liability for wrongful conduct." 7
C. Cases for Wrongful Death of Children Born Alive
Seven cases, including the Dietrich case, have denied recovery
of damages for the wrongful death of a child as a result of injuries
sustained while it was en ventre sa mere but subsequently was born
alive.'" Significantly, two of them have been expressly overruled'"
and a third, the precendent setting Dietrich case, has been overruled

31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 at 503, 504.
Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926);
Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950); Dietrich v. North
hampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W.
710 (1937); Buel v. United Ry., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Aft. 704 (1901); Magnolia Bottling Co. v.
Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
19Bliss v. Passanesi, supra note 18 (overruled by Keyes v. Construction
Service, Inc., supra note 11); Buel v. United fly. supra note 18 (overruled
by Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953)).
17
18
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in everything
but name by the case of Keyes v. Construction Service,
20
Inc.
Six cases, most of them more recent decisions, have allowed
recovery of damages for the wrongful death of a child under the
same circumstances."
Steggall v. Morris" is of particular interest in West Virginia
in the light of the Malone case23 because the Missouri court points
out that:
"A court of justice can hardly say to a mother that she
cannot recover damages for injuries to the child because 'the
child alone suffers damage on that account;' and then deny a
cause of action by the child seeking damages by saying, 'as
the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the
injury, any damage to it which was not too remote to be
recovered for at all was recoverable by her. .

..

'"

In Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,24 the court, after observing
that the trend of modern authority definitely is in favor of allowing
recovery of damages in cases of this type, commented:
"A rule of law that a child who has been rendered permanently blind or deformed as a result of prenatal injuries
caused by the tort of another must go through life so handicapped without remedy should be carefully scrutinized and
considered before adoption."
and then went on to hold that there could be recovery of damages
for the wrongful death of a child caused by prenatal injuries
sustained as a result of a third party's negligence.
Although, in Keyes v. ConstructionService, Inc.,25 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts overthrew the prior Massachusetts
20 Supra note 15.

21 Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Super. Ct 487 118 A.2d
633 (1955); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953), reversing
348 I1. App. 37, 107 N.E.2d 868 (1952), and expressly overruling Allaire v.
Hospital, 184 I1. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d
352 (La. App., decided 1923, opinion published 1949); Keyes v. Construction
Service, Inc., supra note 11; Steggall v. Morris, supra note 19; Jasinsky v.
Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
22 Supra note 19.
2
3 104W. Va. 417, 140 S.E. 340 (1927).
24 19 Conn. Super. Ct. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (1955).
25 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960).
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decisions, it indicated that it would not recognize a cause of action
for the wrongful death of a stillborn child.
D.

Cases for Wrongful Death of Stillborn Children

Six reported decisions have denied recovery of damages for
the wrongful death of stillborn children.2" The denial of recovery
in the cases of Drabbelsv. Skelly Oil Co. and Hogan v. McDaniel"
was based, in part at least, upon the conclusion that an unborn
child is merely a part of its mother's body. It seems incredible that
the courts of last resort in the great states of Tennessee and Nebraska could reach such a conclusion in this supposedly enlightened
era. The Nebraska court, in the Drabbels case volunteered, needless to say without the citation or quotation of any authority, that
the early common law appeared to preclude recovery. In Howell v.
Rushing28 the Oklahoma court, apparently seeking refuge in brevity,
stated little more in a half-page opinion than that it had decided
to adhere to the rule applied in the Drabbels case.
In re Logan's Estate" was a proceeding upon an application
for letters of administration on the goods, chattels and credits of
a child who was stillborn allegedly as a result of injuries sustained
through the negligence of a third person while it was en ventre sa
mere during the third month of its mother's pregnancy. The Surrogate's Court denied letters of administration on the ground that
there was no cause of action for the wrongful death of the child
and therefore no property warranting administration. In a very
brief opinion, the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the order
denying letters of administration but did not state the reason for
its decision.
The denial of recovery in both West v. McCoy"0 and Mace v.
Jung3 was limited expressly to cases where the unborn child was
not viable at the time of injury.
26 Mace v. Jung, (Fed. Dist. Ct. Alaska, November 30, 1962); Drabbels
v. Skelley Ofl Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); In re Logan's
Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 283, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49, app. denied 2 App. Div. 2d 886,
157 N.Y.S.2d 900, aff'd 3 N.Y.2d 800, 144 N.E.2d 644 (1957); West v.
McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958); Hogan v. McDaniel 204
Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P. 2a 217
(Okla. 1953).
27 Supra note 26.
28261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953).
29
Supra note 26.
30 Supranote 26.
31 Supra note 26.
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Eight cases, the earliest in 1949, have allowed recovery of
damages for the wrongful death of stillborn children.3" Rainey v.
Horn33 expressly limited recovery to cases where the unborn child
was viable at the time of injury. The Kentucky court in Mitchell v.
Couch34 made the point that, as a matter of plain biological fact,

35
a viable unborn child is a person. In Poliquin v. McDonald the

court, after referring to the early cases, pointed out that: "Precedents
are valuable so long as they do not obstruct justice or destroy
progress."
In Stidham v. Ashmore,3 6 an Ohio appellate court, respecting
the contention of defense counsel that a distinction should be made
in the case of a stillborn child, observed:
"Such a distinction could lead to bizarre results. Suppose,
for example, viable unborn twins suffered simultaneously the
same prenatal injury of which one died before and the other
after birth. Shall there be a cause of action for the death of
the one and not for that of the other? Surely logic requires
recognition of causes of action for the deaths of both, or for
neither. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has already determined
that there is a cause of action in the case of the one, we
can see no valid reason for denying it in the other."
V.

CASES HOLDING THAT RECOVERY SHOULD NOT
BE DEPENDENT UPON VIABILITY

As of this time, three reported cases have held expressly that

recovery should not be dependent upon whether the fetus was
viable at the time of injury.37 As is apparent from the context of this
writing, some courts have indicated disagreement with this view.
There is no more logic in a distinction based upon viability than

there was in the early cases which denied recovery of damages for
injuries sustained by all children en ventre sa mere. Such a distinc-

tion, like a distinction based upon stillbirth as opposed to livebirth,
surely could lead to bizarre results. It is suggested that the line of
32 Gorke v. LeClerc, 181 A.2d 448 (Conn. 1962); Worgan v. Creggo &
Ferrara, Inc., 11 Terry 258, 128 A.2d 557 (Del. 1956); Mitchell v. Couch,
285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962);
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. 2838 (1949); Rainey v.
Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Stidham v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio
App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Poliquin v. McDonald, 110 N.H. 104, 135
A.2d 249 (1957).
33 Supra note 32.
34
Supra note 32.
35 110 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
36 Supra note 32.
37
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, supra note 13; Bennett v. Hymers, supra
note 13; Smith v. Brennan, supranote 13.
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liability should be coincident with and dependent upon only the
line of causation: that is to say, that liability should be imposed
for an injury either willfully or negligently inflicted by a third
party upon the person of an unborn child provided it is proved
that the injury was proximately caused by such wrong or neglect
without any regard whatever for any wholly independent matter
such as whether the child was viable at the time of injury or
whether the child at some later time was stillborn. It is submitted
that any such wholly independent matter or distinction is in irreconcilable conflict with natural justice and with the purpose of
the applicable common law principle, i.e., to make the wrongdoer
respond in damages for injuries willfully or negligently inflicted
upon the person of another.
VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It is interesting to note that the earliest case on this subject,
Dietrich v. Northampton,3 8 was decided only seventy-nine years ago.
Of course, it set the precedent and cut the pattern for the early
cases which denied recovery of damages for injuries sustained by
children en ventre sa mere. It is more noteworthy that it had been
decided for only sixteen years before it was judicially assailed by
Judge Boggs who, in Allaire v. Hospital,39 very lucidly exposed its
fallacies. Since the Allaire case, the pendulum has swung the other
way and, with considerable acceleration since 1950, so that, now,
a study of the cases admits of no conclusion other than that the
marked trend of authority is toward allowing recovery of damages
for injuries sustained by children en ventre sa mere without regard
to whether the damages are for personal injuries or wrongful death
and, in the latter case, without regard to whether the child is born
alive or is stillborn.
The study of this subject is an invigorating experience for
those who try to breath life into the law and who look upon the
legal profession as a living rather than a dead science. It is refreshing to observe, in our time, the courts of our country boldly
break away from precedents manifestly wrong, unjust and inconsistent with the common law, such as were the early cases in this
field, and change the law. It rebuts the commonly heard criticism
that the law does not or cannot keep up with the times. It illustrates,
in letters high and plain enough for all to see and read, the majesty
of the law.
38

Supra note 5.

39 Supra note 7.
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